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Penny Pinchers or Conflict-Free Crusaders? Why the Eleventh
Circuit Eliminated Service Awards for Class-Action Representatives*
At the heart of every class action is a class representative who champions the
suit. The representative is tasked with managing and organizing the class
members, working hand in hand with attorneys, and responding to discovery
requests. This responsibility, however, is accompanied by several burdens that
place the representative in social and financial limbo. While that uncertainty
has been combated with “incentive awards” that are awarded to a
representative by the court for the representative’s role in initiating the lawsuit
on behalf of the class, the Eleventh Circuit has brought an end to such payments.
In Johnson v. NPAS Solutions LLC, the court held that incentive awards,
despite their prevalence in modern legal practice, created an attorney-client
conflict of interest and violated Supreme Court precedent that specifically
prohibits monetary awards. But the Eleventh Circuit’s rationale is improper for
three reasons: the burden placed on the class representatives far outweighs the
benefits to the class, Johnson is distinguishable from the two Supreme Court
cases used as precedent, and this decision will lead to further conflicts and forum
shopping. In the Eleventh Circuit, class representatives are now at a significant
disadvantage—working abundantly more, for equal recovery with other
plaintiffs, despite substantially more costs and burden. This will lead to a
decrease in willingness to serve as class representative, and attorneys may prefer
to bring claims in other, incentive-award-friendly locations rather than the
Eleventh Circuit.
INTRODUCTION
When class-action cases are settled, the lead plaintiff, generally called the
“class representative,” routinely receives a “service award” or “incentive
payment” for their role in initiating the lawsuit on behalf of the class. These
payments are commonly provided and warranted due to the increased time,
money, and resources necessary for organizing, certifying, and managing class
members.1 Such awards often total a few thousand dollars and are paid from the
* © 2022 Christie Shaw.
1. See Corrado Rizzi, What Does It Mean To Be the Lead Plaintiff in a Class Action Lawsuit?,
CLASSACTION (June 5, 2019), https://www.classaction.org/blog/what-does-it-mean-to-be-the-leadplaintiff-in-a-class-action-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/33GS-XPX5] (“After a lawsuit is filed and begins
to make its way through our legal system—a process that can sometimes take years—the lead plaintiff,
on top of providing evidence during the discovery phase, will closely consult with attorneys and/or
expert witnesses, and must be available for hearings, strategy sessions, depositions, and any other
lawsuit-related appearances or conferences.”).
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aggregate sum that defendants pay to resolve class actions. However, the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently issued a decision that prohibits
these awards.2
The class representative has a duty to vigorously pursue the interests of
the class throughout the lawsuit.3 The role requires exercising control over the
class members and determining the best legal strategy for the lawsuit.4 Often,
class representatives are subjected to intrusive discovery requests regarding
their qualifications and the alleged claims of the class.5 To prepare for the class
action, class representatives conduct document review and help counsel gather
information from depositions.6 Due to a high settlement rate among class
actions, class representatives work closely with counsel to assess the potential
settlement offers.7 Above all, class representatives must put the class members’
interests before their own to ensure a fair and just outcome.8
Still, class representatives bear significant burdens. The legal costs of
class-action litigation creates a free-rider problem where idle class members
reap the benefits of a successful settlement.9 However, if the lawsuit is
unsuccessful, the class representative is liable for all legal costs so long as other
arrangements have not been made regarding liability.10 Out-of-pocket expenses
to meet procedural requirements—such as providing notice to class members of
the pending suit—can become increasingly expensive.11 Adding insult to injury,
class representatives routinely suffer attacks on their character from employers
and opposing counsel.12 Considering these duties and liabilities, the Eleventh
Circuit’s recent decision fails to respect the position of class representatives.
In Johnson v. NPAS Solutions LLC,13 the Eleventh Circuit held that
incentive awards created an attorney-client conflict of interest and violated
Supreme Court precedent that, despite their prevalence in modern legal

2. Johnson v. NPAS Sols., LLC, 975 F.3d 1244, 1255 (11th Cir. 2020) (holding that Supreme
Court precedent prohibits incentive awards like Johnson’s and that the award creates a conflict of
interest between Johnson and the other class members).
3. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD) § 30.16 (1995).
4. Gregory J. Brod, The Role of the Named Plaintiff in a Class Action Lawsuit, BROD LAW FIRM:
S.F. INJ. LAW. BLOG (May 4, 2012), https://www.sanfranciscoinjurylawyerblog.com/the_role_of_the_
named_plaintif_1/ [https://perma.cc/7ZUK-84FR].
5. See id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Donald N. Dewees, J. Robert S. Prichard & Michael J. Trebilcock, An Economic Analysis of
Cost and Fee Rules for Class Actions, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 155, 158–59 (1981).
10. Id. at 159.
11. Id.
12. Jason Jarvis, Note, A New Approach to Plaintiff Incentive Fees in Class Action Lawsuits, 115 NW.
L. REV. 919, 927 (2020).
13. 975 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2020).
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practice, specifically prohibits monetary awards.14 Johnson is an extension of
Trustees v. Greenough15 and Central Railroad & Banking Co. v. Pettus16—two cases
from the late 1800s which held that incentive awards and similar payments were
barred because they created conflicts of interest between representing attorneys
and class members.17
In order to ensure equity, proper administration, and certainty, circuit
court judges must follow binding precedent set by the Supreme Court.18
Though the Eleventh Circuit attempted to do exactly that, its reliance on
Greenough and Pettus is misguided. This Recent Development argues that the
Eleventh Circuit’s decision to classify modern-day incentive awards as conflicts
of interest was improper for three reasons: (1) the burden placed on the class
representative far outweighs the benefits to the class; (2) Johnson is
distinguishable from Greenough and Pettus; and (3) the decision will lead to
further conflicts and forum shopping. Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit’s
holding will negatively impact the willingness of individuals to serve as class
representatives and promote further inconsistency in the law.19 Ultimately, the
Johnson court’s decision threatens the future state of class actions by stripping
away well-deserved compensation from lead plaintiffs and placing trivial cents
or dollars into the pockets of class members.
This Recent Development proceeds in four parts. Part I analyzes the
background and case law used by the Johnson majority for its findings. Part II
examines the flaws in the Johnson majority’s holding by pointing out the
resulting inequity between the class representative and the class members, as
well as the court’s failure to consider alternative Supreme Court precedent on
this subject. Part III explores the majority’s decision to strictly adhere to the
Supreme Court’s decision in Greenough and Pettus, which disregards practicality
and confuses the original definition of “incentive award.” Last, Part IV discusses
the new conflict of interest between class-action attorneys and class members,
as attorneys may be self-interested in choosing a forum, ultimately leading to
forum shopping.

14. Id. at 1248–49.
15. 105 U.S. 527 (1882).
16. 113 U.S. 116 (1885).
17. See Greenough, 105 U.S. at 537–38; Pettus, 113 U.S. at 127–28; Johnson, 975 F.3d at 1259.
18. Johnson, 975 F.3d at 1248.
19. See Mark Moller, The Checks and Balances of Forum Shopping, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 171,
176 (2012) (“[W]hen it comes to the practice of forum shopping, constitutional law is in disarray. Our
jurisdictional infrastructure enables forum shopping. Erie condemns it. And scholars have learned to
live with the resulting dissonance and incoherence.”).
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I. BACKGROUND OF JOHNSON
In 2017, Charles Johnson—representing himself and a putative class—sued
NPAS Solution, LLC (“NPAS”) in the Southern District of Florida.20 There,
Johnson and the class alleged violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act (“TCPA”).21 After discovery and various motions, the parties successfully
settled on November 2, 2017, less than eight months after the lawsuit was filed.22
For settlement purposes, Johnson moved to certify the class because he believed
that the $1,432,000 settlement was in the best interests of the class members.23
Once the district court approved the settlement and certified the class, the
court appointed Johnson as the class representative.24 The district court, in its
order, also permitted Johnson to petition the court to receive a payment not to
exceed $6,000 for his role in managing the class.25 Notably, class members were
able to opt out of, and object to, the settlement.26 Some months later, the “class
members were . . . informed that NPAS would establish a settlement fund, that
class counsel would seek attorneys’ fees amounting to 30% of the fund, and that
Johnson would seek a $6,000 incentive award from the fund. In total, 9,543 class
members submitted claims for recovery.”27
On the day of the deadline to file objections, only one class member
objected—the appellant.28 First, the appellant argued that Johnson’s $6,000
incentive award violated the Supreme Court’s decisions in Trustees v. Greenough
and Central Railroad & Banking Co. v. Pettus.29 Second, the appellant argued that
the incentive payment created a conflict of interest between Johnson and the
class members.30
Even though courts have routinely approved these awards over the last
century,31 the Eleventh Circuit held that the Greenough and Pettus decisions
prohibit any award that either compensates class representatives for time spent
20. Johnson, 975 F.3d at 1249.
21. Id. Thereafter, Johnson and the class quickly moved to the settlement phase. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1249–50. From these figures, it appears that each class member would receive, at most,
$105. This allotment is determined by first taking the settlement amount ($1,432,000), minus attorney’s
fees ($429,600). The remaining $1,002,400 is further reduced by the $6,000 incentive payment to
arrive at $996,400. Notably, that number is taken pro rata from each class member’s recovery. Lastly,
$996,400 divided equally amongst 9,543 class members equals about $105 per person.
28. Id. at 1250.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. The Fourth Circuit has acknowledged the prevalence of incentive awards and has allowed
them in practice. Berry v. Schulman, 807 F.3d 600, 613 (4th Cir. 2015) (“[Incentive payments are]
‘fairly typical in class action cases.’” (quoting Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 958–59
(9th Cir. 2009)).
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or rewards them for bringing the class lawsuit.32 The court acknowledged the
prevalence of service awards, stating that “although it’s true that such awards
are commonplace in modern class-action litigation, that doesn’t make them
lawful, and it doesn’t free us to ignore Supreme Court precedent forbidding
them.”33
Reviewing the Greenough and Pettus decisions, the Eleventh Circuit laid
out its rationale.34 The majority stated, “Greenough and Pettus are the seminal
cases establishing the rule—applicable in so many class-action cases, including
this one—that attorneys’ fees can be paid from a ‘common fund.’”35 Further, the
two cases determined limits on specific types of awards that litigants and
attorneys can claim from the fund.36 After the court introduced the binding
precedent that arose from these seminal cases, it explored the particular facts of
each case, starting with Greenough.
In Greenough, the plaintiff, who held bonds in the Florida Railroad
Company, sued the trustees of another fund on behalf of himself and other
bondholders.37 The plaintiff, taking on the colossal burden of litigation and
advancing most of the expenses, filed a petition to recover money from the
settlement fund for his expenses and services rendered.38 There, the plaintiff
sought two monetary awards for his efforts: (1) an award for “necessary
expenditures” including attorney’s fees and (2) “an allowance of $2,500 a year for
ten years of personal services” and reimbursement for his “personal expenditures”
for “railroad fares and hotel bills.”39 On appeal, the Supreme Court approved
the award for “reasonable costs . . . and expenses incurred in the fair prosecution
of the suit” known as “necessary expenditures.”40 However, the Court
determined that the second allowance for personal expenditures was

32. Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 537–38 (1882) (holding that the trial court properly
awarded the bondholder his attorney fees, costs, and expenses but not his personal fees or expenses);
Cent. R.R. & Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116, 128 (1885) (reversing a judgment that granted
appellees their costs and fees associated with preparing a suit on behalf of appellants’ creditors to obtain
a lien against appellants’ property because, although appellees were entitled to collect the fees of
unsecured creditors other than their immediate clients, the fees awarded by the lower court were
excessive).
33. Johnson, 975 F.3d at 1260.
34. Id. at 1254–57.
35. Id. at 1255–56 (citing Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980)).
36. Id. at 1256.
37. Greenough, 105 U.S. at 528.
38. Id. at 529.
39. Id. at 530 (emphasis added).
40. Id. at 537. Other “necessary expenditures” in this case included “fees of solicitors and counsel,
costs of court, and sundry small incidental items for copying records and the like, the whole amounting
to $34,192.62.” Id. at 530. Also allowed were “sundry fees paid in maintaining other suits in New York,
and on appeal to this court, attorneys’ fees for resisting fraudulent coupons, and expenses paid to
attorneys and agents to investigate fraudulent grants of the trust lands.” Id.
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objectionable.41 Although the Court provided some scenarios where this
allowance would be tolerated, such as payments to a trustee for personal services
rendered for managing a trust,42 it ultimately held that the allowance “would
present too great a temptation to parties to intermeddle in the management of
valuable property or funds in which they have only the interest of creditors.”43
Four years after the Greenough decision came Pettus. In that case, the
Supreme Court recognized that attorneys have a permissible claim to fees from
the class’s common fund for their rendered services.44 Additionally, the Court
held an attorney’s claim should be awarded based on a percentage of the class
recovery.45 Significantly, Pettus reiterated the distinction between necessary
expenditures and personal expenditures as explained in Greenough.46 That is,
while necessary expenditures are proper, personal expenses are “unsupported
by reason or authority.”47
The Greenough and Pettus holdings convinced the Eleventh Circuit that
Johnson’s incentive award was not a necessary expenditure and therefore not
similar to permissible attorney’s fees for services rendered on behalf of the
class.48 As such, Johnson’s contentions regarding the practical use of incentive
awards failed to persuade the court because the court believed that an incentive
award was more akin to personal expenditures, which creates a conflict of
interest.49 Even after citing to Berry v. Schulman50—a 2015 Fourth Circuit
decision expressly approving incentive payments51—the Eleventh Circuit
essentially claimed its hands were tied.52 In Berry, the Fourth Circuit asked
41. Id. at 537.
42. Id. at 537–38 (“Where an allowance is made to trustees for their personal services, it is made
with a view to secure greater activity and diligence in the performance of the trust, and to induce
persons of reliable character and business capacity to accept the office of trustee. These considerations
have no application to the case of a creditor seeking his rights in a judicial proceeding.”).
43. Id. at 538.
44. Johnson v. NPAS Sols., LLC, 975 F.3d 1244, 1257 (11th Cir. 2020).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. (quoting Cent. R.R. & Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116, 122 (1885)).
48. See id. at 1256–58 (discussing the difference between necessary and personal expenditures in
Greenough and Pettus and applying that reasoning to Johnson).
49. In response to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court stated, “Johnson’s
argument implies that Rule 23 has something to say about incentive awards, and thus has some bearing
on the continuing vitality of Greenough and Pettus. But it doesn’t—and so it doesn’t.” Id. at 1259.
Concerning use in everyday practice, the court eloquently said “so far as we can tell, [the prevalence of
incentive payments] is a product of inertia and inattention, not adherence to law.” Id.
50. 807 F.3d 600 (4th Cir. 2015).
51. Id. at 614 (“Under these circumstances, we defer to the judgment of the district court in
approving the Class Representatives’ awards . . . under Rule 23(a)(4).”). There was no mention of
either the Greenough or the Pettus decision in this case. See generally id. (approving incentive awards
without addressing either Greenough or Pettus).
52. Johnson, 975 F.3d at 1260–61 (“If the Supreme Court wants to overrule Greenough and Pettus,
that’s its prerogative. Likewise, if either the Rules Committee or Congress doesn’t like the result we’ve
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whether an incentive payment gave the class representative preferential
treatment over the class members.53 However, the Berry court never referenced
either Greenough or Pettus. Instead, the Berry court relied on two Ninth Circuit
cases.54 The main concerns in Berry were whether the incentive payment was
determined at the beginning of litigation55 and whether the class members’
participation in the class action was conditioned on supporting the incentive
payment.56 Because neither of these limitations applied, the incentive payment
was permitted.57
The consequences of Johnson are apparent. Abandoning practicality and
common use, the Eleventh Circuit treats class representatives as second-class.
But does the increase of a few dollars or cents in the pockets of class members
outweigh the possible seismic shift in class-action litigation to come?
II. THE FLAWS OF JOHNSON
Although it seems at first glance that Johnson correctly follows binding
precedent, the logic of the opinion is suspect. There are two key flaws in the
majority’s argument that discredit the Eleventh Circuit’s holding: (1) the
majority failed to grasp the net benefits of the incentive payments to the lead
plaintiff compared to the trivial benefit incurred by class members individually;
and (2) the court failed to address Holmes v. Continental Can Co.58 and other
recent guidance on incentive awards from the Supreme Court.59 These flaws are
discussed in the following two sections.
A.

Weighing Benefits

The class representative serves as the champion for the class-action
lawsuit. Although this title comes with privileges, such as unfettered access to
attorneys and class members, the burden of this role often outweighs the
benefits. Because a class action cannot function effectively without a class
representative, the incentives for assuming the role should adequately make up
for any burden associated with it. For cases where the class recovery is low, “a
class member may even experience a net loss from acting as class champion
because the small recoveries normally gained from the case are not enough to
reached, they are free to amend Rule 23 or to provide for incentive awards by statute. But as matters
stand now, we find ourselves constrained to reverse.”).
53. Berry, 807 F.3d at 613–14.
54. See id. at 613 (first citing Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 959 (9th Cir. 2009);
then citing Radcliffe v. Experian Info. Sols. Inc., 715 F.3d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 2013)).
55. Id. (citing Rodriguez, 563 F.3d at 959).
56. Id. (citing Radcliffe, 715 F.3d at 1164).
57. Id. at 614.
58. 706 F.2d 1144 (11th Cir. 1983).
59. See, e.g., Frank v. Gaos, 139 S. Ct. 1041 (2019) (questioning whether a cy pres award of classaction proceeds providing no direct relief to class members supports class certification).
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cover the increased costs.”60 In the same vein, a prospective representative may
be disincentivized from serving if the class recovery is expected to be high and
being grouped with the general pool of class members offers more anonymity
and comfort.61 In either circumstance, the individual gambles with the
opportunity cost of being the class representative.
The potential burdens associated with the class-representative role are
extensive. At a minimum, the class representative is typically deposed by the
defendant’s counsel, which can be time consuming and intrusive.62 Moreover,
they are expected to bear the costs of discovery requests, reputational damage,
and possible sanctions if the case is deemed frivolous.63 Considering these extra
duties and requirements, should this individual receive the same monetary
compensation as their idle class members? This Recent Development argues no.
As expressed above, although “all of these costs are borne directly by the lead
plaintiff, the fruits of their efforts are shared pro rata with the entire class.”64
Despite the perception surrounding class representatives,65 the actual
amount they recover from class-action settlement funds is generally modest.66
A 2006 empirical study performed by Theodore Eisenberg and Geoffrey P.
Miller surveyed ninety class-action lawsuits and found that “the total incentive
award to all representative plaintiffs constituted, on average, 0.16 percent of the
class recovery.”67 The median was only 0.02%.68 Further, they found that the
incentive award was split among the class representatives, and the average
award per representative was $15,992 while the median award was $4,357.69
Ultimately, the study detailed that “[t]he size of total incentive awards was
strongly associated with the size of the class recovery.”70 Therefore, the
incentive award generally works in tandem with the winnings of the class—
balancing the interests of the class members’ recovery with the rendered services
of the class representative.
60. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An
Empirical Study, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1303, 1305–06 (2006).
61. Id. at 1306.
62. Id. at 1305.
63. Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, Lead Plaintiff Incentives in Aggregate Litigation, 72 VAND.
L. REV. 1923, 1931 (2019).
64. Id. (citing Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 60, at 1305 (noting that while “[n]amed plaintiffs
incur costs in performing their role . . . [,] the benefit from the recovery is shared with other class
members.”)).
65. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 60, at 1312–13 (“Others have expressed concern about the
fairness of the named plaintiff receiving a larger award than the rest of the class. Incentive awards have
been stigmatized as a means for paying off ‘professional plaintiffs.’”).
66. Id. at 1308 (“When given, incentive awards constituted a small fraction of total class
recovery.”).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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To combat the disparity of benefits between the class representative and
other class members, courts have approved incentive awards “that are
withdrawn from the common fund at the conclusion of the common fund
case.”71 This amount is taken from the aggregate of the class members.72 Indeed,
scholars have found that incentive awards are “consistent with one legal theory
loosely underlying such awards . . . that class members would be unjustly
enriched if they were able to secure the services of the class representatives at
no cost.”73 In cases where the individual recovery is recognized by a vast number
of class members and the actual payment is small, the class representative may
actually incur a significant loss.74
Putting this disparity of impact into perspective, it is helpful to look at
Cook v. Niedert,75 a Seventh Circuit decision affirming the importance and
necessity of incentive payments in class actions.76 The lead plaintiff in that case
was Archie Cook, a truck driver who filed a class action on behalf of the
Teamsters Local 705 Health and Welfare Fund.77 After reaching a settlement,
the district court judge instructed a special master to review and compute the
incentive award for Mr. Cook—in this case, the amount totaled $25,000.78
Though this is a happy ending for Mr. Cook, who maintained his incentive
award after the Seventh Circuit’s review, it is important to consider the
alternative. What would this case look like if Mr. Cook did not recoup the
$25,000? For this hypothetical, it is vital to break down the logistics of the class
and each participant’s recovery in simple terms. At the district court level, there
were over 20,000 class members.79 The final recovery amount for class members

71. WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, 5 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 17:5 (5th ed. 2021) (citing
Radcliffe v. Experian Info. Sols. Inc., 715 F.3d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 2013) (“In cases where the class
receives a monetary settlement, the [incentive] awards are often taken from the class’s recovery.”)); id.
(citing Shane Grp. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., No. 10-CV-14360, 2015 WL 1498888, at *18
(E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2015) (“Payment of incentive awards to class representatives is a reasonable use
of settlement funds.”), vacated and remanded, 825 F.3d 299 (6th Cir. 2016)).
72. Id.
73. Id. (citing In re Anthem, Inc. Data Breach Litig., No. 15-MD-02617-LHK, 2018 WL 3960068,
at *32 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2018)) (rejecting special master recommendation that incentive awards be
paid from attorney’s fees in part because “class members would be unjustly enriched [in that] they
[would be] able to secure the services of the class representatives at no cost”).
74. See id. § 17:18 (“[I]n class suits, the claims will almost invariably be small in nature, yet the
class representatives most worthy of an award will typically be those who worked the hardest and
suffered most.”).
75. 142 F.3d 1004 (7th Cir. 1998).
76. Id. at 1016 (citing In re Cont’l Ill. Sec. Litig., 962 F.2d 566, 571 (7th Cir. 1992) (“Because a
named plaintiff is an essential ingredient of any class action, an incentive award is appropriate if it is
necessary to induce an individual to participate in the suit.”)).
77. Id. at 1008–09.
78. Id. at 1009.
79. Cook v. McCarron, Nos. 92 C 7042 & 95 C 0828, 1997 WL 47448, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 30,
1997), aff’d sub nom. Cook v. Niedert, 142 F.3d 1004 (7th Cir. 1998). The exact number of class members

100 N.C. L. REV. 1293 (2022)

1302

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100

was over $14,000,000.80 Divided up equally and irrespective of other mandatory
fees, each class member would recover $700, absent an incentive award. Since
the court permitted Mr. Cook to recover $25,000 as an incentive award, each
class member’s recovery was reduced further by their pro rata share of Mr.
Cook’s incentive payment. Therefore, the net recovery of each class member
totaled $700 (the amount originally won in the settlement per person), minus
$1.25 (the amount of Mr. Cook’s $25,000 incentive payment divided equally by
20,000 class members). So, with the incentive payment, each class member
recouped $698.75. Without the incentive payment, each class member would
have recouped $700. Mr. Cook, on the other hand, would have received the
average class-member recovery minus the costs, expenses, and reputational
damage incurred as lead plaintiff—ultimately leading to a major net loss
compared to other members of his class.81
Understandably, most class members would not volunteer to act as lead
plaintiff if they worked abundantly more but their net recovery was
significantly less than other members of their class. As other courts and scholars
have noted, lead plaintiffs provide unequivocal support to attorneys and class
members alike.82 Placing further burdens on these individuals can only
negatively impact class-representative participation going forward.
B.

Binding Precedent

In addition to failing to take practical considerations into account, the
Johnson majority’s decision to classify modern-day incentive awards as conflicts
of interest was improper because the decision also neglected to address a
binding case on point, Holmes v. Continental Can Co.83 and failed to consider
helpful insights from other circuits and the Supreme Court.
In Holmes, eight class representatives and 118 class members filed suit
against the Continental Can Company and United Steelworkers of America.84
The complaint alleged discrimination on the basis of sex in employment
was greater than 20,000; however, for the sake of clarity, the figure used by the Seventh Circuit will
be used here. Niedert, 142 F.3d at 1007–08.
80. Niedert, 142 F.3d at 1008.
81. Appellants/Cross-Appellees’ Brief at 28–29, Niedert, 142 F.3d 1004 (Nos. 97-1584, 97-1666
& 97-1667), 1997 WL 33623162, at *28–29. (“The unrebutted evidence shows that Mr. Cook spent
hundreds of hours working on this case with class counsel . . . . The record also showed a long history
of retaliation against union dissidents at Teamsters Local 705, including physical beatings and
lawsuits . . . . During litigation, Mr. Cook was subjected to a sanctions motion that, if successful, would
have had a devastating financial impact on this truck driver.”).
82. See Berry v. Schulman, 807 F.3d 600, 614 (4th Cir. 2015); Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 60,
at 1310.
83. Johnson v. NPAS Sols., LLC, 975 F.3d 1244, 1264 (11th Cir. 2020) (Martin, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (“The majority’s analysis also disregards the analysis set forth in this
Court’s ruling in Holmes . . . which is binding in our Circuit.”).
84. Holmes v. Cont’l Can Co., 706 F.2d 1144, 1146 (11th Cir. 1983).
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opportunities.85 In 1978, after two years of settlement negotiations, the final
proposed settlement called for injunctive and declaratory relief and a $43,775
lump sum to the class.86 However, issues arose when the eight class
representatives adopted a distribution method that would award them one-half
of the fund.87 Although thirty-nine class members objected to the payment, the
district court approved the class certification in 1980 and overruled their
objections.88 Thereafter, the class members appealed.89
Other circuits, including the Eleventh, have assessed the fairness of an
incentive award granted to class representatives.90 Courts will generally uphold
the incentive payment so long as the payment is not for the class
representative’s personal gain and does not compromise the interests of the
class.91 In Holmes, the Eleventh Circuit applied such an analysis and recognized
that courts often “‘refuse[] to approve settlements on the ground that a disparity
in benefits’ between the named plaintiffs and the absent members of the class
‘evidenced either substantive unfairness or inadequate representation.’”92
Hence, if the settlement calls for the preferential treatment of a class
representative, a substantial burden is placed on the proponents to prove that
the settlement is fair.93 Further, the “inference of unfairness” associated with

85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1146–47.
89. Id. at 1147.
90. See, e.g., Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 977 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that district courts
are required to “individually” evaluate the award to each named plaintiff, using “relevant factors
including the actions the plaintiff has taken to protect the interests of the class, the degree to which the
class has benefitted from those actions, . . . [and] the amount of time and effort the plaintiff expended
in pursuing the litigation” (quoting Cook v. Niedert, 142 F.3d 1004, 1016 (7th Cir. 1998))); In re U.S.
Bancorp Litig., 291 F.3d 1035, 1038 (8th Cir. 2002) (relying on similar factors to approve as fair $2,000
payments to five named plaintiffs out of a class potentially numbering more than four million in a
settlement of $3,000,000). Other circuits have also recognized the proper inquiry as being whether the
incentive award is fair. See, e.g., Chieftain Royalty Co. v. Enervest Energy Inst. Fund XIII-A, L.P.,
888 F.3d 455, 468–69 (10th Cir. 2017) (rejecting percentage-based incentive award because, among
other things, it encouraged a class representative to favor monetary remedy over injunctive relief,
“creating a potential conflict between the interest of the class representative and the class”); Berry v.
Schulman, 807 F.3d 600, 613–14 (4th Cir. 2015) (rejecting objector’s argument that incentive award
created a conflict of interest and upholding award); Cobell v. Salazar, 679 F.3d 909, 922 (D.C. Cir.
2012) (holding that incentive award was fair and did not create “an impermissible conflict” because the
settlement agreement “provided no guarantee” that class representatives would receive incentive
payments); Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 333 n.65 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that district
court did not abuse its discretion in approving incentive award because it “discussed the role played by
the several class representatives and the risks taken by these parties in prosecuting this matter”).
91. Johnson v. NPAS Sols. LLC, 975 F.3d 1244, 1266 (11th Cir. 2020) (Martin, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
92. Id. (quoting Holmes, 706 F.2d at 1148).
93. Holmes, 706 F.2d at 1146 (explaining that eight named plaintiffs were not entitled to receive
approximately one-half of the common fund based on their meritorious individual claims).
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such unequal distributions “may be rebutted by a factual showing that the
higher allocations to certain parties are rationally based on legitimate
considerations.”94
The Holmes court found that the defendant class representatives did “not
overcome the facial unfairness of the disparate distribution of [the] . . . award.”95
Instead, the only evidence supporting the payment was offered by the class
representatives’ counsel.96 Although a counsel’s testimony is given great weight
when approving class-action settlements, in this case, it was insufficient to
prove the merits of the class representative’s award.97 In turn, the Eleventh
Circuit found in favor of the class members.98
While the appellant in Johnson had some justified concerns regarding
conflicts of interest,99 a simple Holmes analysis would remedy those
frustrations.100 Applying this analysis, it becomes abundantly clear from
Johnson’s appellee brief that the class members’ recovery was sizeable compared
to other class-action settlements.
After robust direct mail and publication notice, as well as the creation of a
dedicated settlement website and toll-free telephone number,101 9,543 class
members submitted valid claims for their pro rata share of the settlement
fund.102 After deducting the costs of notice and claims administration, attorney’s
fees and expenses, and an incentive award to Mr. Johnson, each participating
class member stood to receive approximately $80.103 This per-claimant recovery
compares favorably to other TCPA class action settlements.104

94. Id. at 1148.
95. Id. at 1160.
96. Id. at 1149.
97. Id. at 1149–50.
98. Id. at 1151.
99. See Johnson v. NPAS Sols., LLC, 975 F.3d 1244, 1252–53 (11th Cir. 2020) (“While, in theory,
class counsel act as fiduciaries for the class as a whole, once a class action reaches the fee-setting stage,
‘plaintiffs’ counsel’s understandable interest in getting paid the most for its work representing the class’
comes into conflict . . . . Accordingly, ‘the district court must assume the role of fiduciary for the class
plaintiffs’ and ‘ensure that the class is afforded the opportunity to represent its own best interests.’”
(quoting In re Mercury Interactive Corp. Secs. Litig., 618 F.3d 988, 994 (9th Cir. 2010))).
100. Id. at 1267 (Martin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“This fairness-to-ensureno-conflict analysis goes to the heart of Ms. Dickenson’s stated concerns, and its application would
dispel her fear of collusion here.”). Moreover, other class action incentive payments and overall
recovery have been brought on near identical TCPA claims. See infra note 103 and accompanying text;
supra Part I (discussing the TCPA claim at bar in Johnson).
101. See, e.g., Welcome to the Johnson v. NPAS Solutions LLC Settlement Website, KCC, http://
johnsonnpassolutionssettlement.com/ [https://perma.cc/MKZ4-QH9H]; Frequently Asked Questions,
KCC, http://www.johnsonnpassolutionssettlement.com/frequently-asked-question.aspx [http://perma
.cc/RDE7-4EQ9].
102. Johnson, 975 F.3d at 1250.
103. Id. at 1251.
104. Brief of Appellee at 3, Johnson, 975 F.3d 1244 (No. 18-12344).
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Arguably, Johnson’s $6,000 incentive award—considering his contribution
and dedication to over 9,000 class members—did not compromise the class
interest for his personal gain.105 Moreover, it can hardly be maintained that this
incentive award evidences substantive unfairness or inadequate representations
when other courts have approved greater incentive awards in similar TCPA
class actions.106
At least one member of the Supreme Court has also added helpful insight
on incentive awards107 and “acknowledged that a proposed settlement award
included incentive payments for the named plaintiffs, and did not question the
viability of those incentive awards.”108 In Frank v. Gaos,109 the plaintiffs brought
a class-action claim against Google and later negotiated a settlement
agreement.110 At issue were the $5,000,000 cy pres payments taken out of the
total settlement agreement to be given to a nonparty, nonprofit organization.111
The Frank majority did not address the merits of the settlement award.112
However, in his dissent, Justice Thomas argued that the cy pres arrangement
did not obtain any relief for the class but instead “secur[ed] significant benefits”
for the class counsel and the named plaintiff.113 Justice Thomas reaffirmed that
105. Id. at 46 (“Ms. Dickenson ignores the critical steps Mr. Johnson took to protect the interests
of the class, and that he spent considerable time pursuing class members’ claims at substantial risk to
his own financial interests . . . . As a result, the $6,000 award, which represents a small fraction of the
$1.432 million settlement, is well within the range of reasonableness, as the district court properly
concluded.”).
106. See, e.g., Schwyhart v. AmSher Collection Servs., Inc., No. 15-CV-01175-JEO (N.D. Ala.
Mar. 16, 2017) (approving a $10,000 incentive award to a class representative in TCPA class action
containing 28,412 class members who were awarded a settlement amount of $1,700,000); Craftwood
Lumber Co. v. Interline Brands, Inc., No. 11-CV-4462, 2015 WL 1399367, at *6–7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 23,
2015) (approving a $25,000 service award to a class representative in TCPA class action where the
settlement amount was $40,000,000).
107. Johnson, 975 F.3d at 1267 (Martin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Our court
adopted this analysis in Holmes. And it addresses the concerns about incentive awards raised by at least
one member of the Supreme Court.”).
108. Id. at 1267; see also id. at 1267 n.2 (quoting China Agritech, Inc. v. Resh, 138 S. Ct. 1800,
1810–11 n.7 (2018) (“One year earlier, the Supreme Court similarly recognized the viability of a
‘financial benefit’ to a class representative that goes ‘above and beyond her individual claim.’ The
majority calls this dicta, but it cannot seriously dispute that the Supreme Court acknowledged that a
class representative may be entitled to compensation in his or her role as the person bringing suit.”)).
109. 139 S. Ct. 1041 (2019).
110. Id. at 1043.
111. See id. Cy pres awards are used to distribute settlement money to the next best group of
consumers whose interest may coincide with the class members; this payment is usually leftover
settlement money and is given to a charity whose mission aligns with the issue at the center of the
lawsuit. What Is a Cy Pres Award?, CLASSACTION, https://www.classaction.org/learn/cy-pres [https://
perma.cc/ABB4-AQFJ]; see, e.g., Lane v. Facebook, 696 F.3d 811, 819 (9th Cir. 2012) (“As we recently
recognized, the ‘cy pres doctrine allows a court to distribute unclaimed or non-distributable portions of
a class action settlement fund to the ‘next best’ class of beneficiaries.’” (quoting Nachshin v. AOL,
LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 1036 (9th Cir. 2011))).
112. Frank, 139 S. Ct. at 1046.
113. Id. at 1047 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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the arrangement “strongly suggests that the interests of the class were not
adequately represented.”114
In Johnson, Judge Martin, concurring in part and dissenting in part,
interpreted Justice Thomas’s findings in the Frank dissent.115 Judge Martin
explained, “I read Justice Thomas’s brief dissent in Frank to address his concern
about whether the cy pres arrangement in that case was fair, as opposed to
whether disparate awards in class actions are legally permissible as a general
matter.”116 Judge Martin maintained “that the fairness analysis developed by
many circuit courts, including [the Eleventh Circuit], can protect against
conflicts between a class representative and absent class members.”117
Judge Martin correctly interpreted Justice Thomas’s dissent. If Justice
Thomas wanted to condemn the existence of cy pres payments altogether, he
could have easily done so. Instead, Justice Thomas carefully questioned
“whether a class action is ‘superior to other available methods for fairly and
efficiently adjudicating the controversy’ when it serves only as a vehicle through
which to extinguish the absent class members’ claims without providing them
any relief.”118
It appears that Justice Thomas’s main issue was not with the allocation of
settlement money to a nonprofit, plaintiff’s attorney, or lead representative, but
with the resulting inequity or unfairness experienced by the class members.
Indeed, his dissent suggested that cy pres payments may be permitted, unless
they resulted in class members being significantly worse off than the persons
organizing and prosecuting the class.119 If Justice Thomas believed this to be the
case about cy pres payments—where the paid nonprofit organization had no
part in aiding the class—it is hard to believe that his opinion would change for
incentive payments—where the lead plaintiff actually dedicated time, money,
and resources for the benefit of the class. Notably, Justice Thomas’s dissent is
persuasive—not binding. And, this may be why the Johnson court refused to
distinguish Greenough and Pettus from Johnson, despite most evidence and
sources pointing toward the contrary. However, the logic still stands, and the
Eleventh Circuit should have taken this, as well as other relevant precedent,
into account.
The lack of consideration for Holmes and Frank is not the only source of
error in Johnson. The court should have distinguished Johnson from Greenough
and Pettus because the term “incentive award” was incorrectly likened to
114. Id.
115. Johnson v. NPAS Sols., LLC, 975 F.3d 1244, 1267 (Martin, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Frank, 139 S. Ct. at 1047 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)).
119. Id.
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personal expenditures, which have created conflicts of interest in the past. This
determination goes against scholars’ interpretation of the term “incentive
award” in modern practice.
III. JOHNSON IS DISTINGUISHABLE FROM GREENOUGH AND PETTUS
The Johnson court, somewhat alluding to the practicality of incentive
awards, stated, “Although it’s true that such awards are commonplace in modern
class-action litigation, that doesn’t make them lawful, and it doesn’t free us to
ignore Supreme Court precedent forbidding them. If the Supreme Court wants
to overrule Greenough and Pettus, that’s its prerogative.”120 Admittedly, the
Supreme Court has noted that questions regarding a dated law’s application to
a modern case are irrelevant and only the Supreme Court has the power to
reconsider its own precedent.121
Still, Johnson should not be compared to Greenough and Pettus. Perhaps
most damning to the Eleventh Circuit’s holding was its reliance on comparing
a “personal service award” from Greenough to the “incentive award” in Johnson.
As previously discussed, the “personal award” struck down by the Supreme
Court in Greenough encompassed “an allowance of $2,500 a year for ten years of
personal services” and reimbursement for the plaintiffs “personal expenditures”
for “railroad fares and hotel bills.”122 These expenses are not akin to Johnson’s,
which were incurred by his participation in creating and managing the class.123
Contrary to the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning, Johnson’s expenses are actually
more similar to the approved award in Greenough for “reasonable costs . . . and
expenses incurred in the fair prosecution of the suit.”124
The court harped too much on the term “incentive” insofar as it reasoned
that closely tying the lead plaintiff’s level of involvement to the amount of
incentive payment recovered invariably leads to a conflict of interest between
the lead plaintiff and other class members.125 However, that misstates the
relationship between incentive awards and plaintiff participation. The dissent
in Johnson, highlighting this key error, stated,
In discussing the first case to use the term “incentive award,”
[scholars] say[] “although labeling the payment an ‘incentive
award,’” the rationale that the court employs speaks more to
compensation than incentive, suggesting that the class
representatives are being paid for their service to the class, not

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Johnson, 975 F.3d at 1260.
Bosse v. Oklahoma, 137 S. Ct. 1, 2 (2016).
Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 530 (1882).
Johnson, 975 F.3d at 1249.
Greenough, 105 U.S. at 537.
Johnson, 975 F.3d at 1258.

100 N.C. L. REV. 1293 (2022)

1308

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100

so as to ensure that class members will step forward in the
future.126
Hence, an incentive award does not actually produce a conflict of interest
because the lead plaintiff’s interest does not become that of a creditor to the suit
he is representing. The term “incentive” simply refers to the increased
motivation for a lead plaintiff to step forward.
IV. FEARS OF FORUM SHOPPING
Although it has been argued that incentive awards do not create a conflict
of interest between class representatives and class members,127 there is a conflict
that the Johnson majority failed to foresee. That is, a conflict now exists between
class-action attorneys and class members because attorneys may be selfinterested in choosing a forum. Attorneys now must wrestle with the choice to
either pursue a case in which they must pay for the services rendered to the
class representative or attempt to obtain jurisdiction in another circuit.
If attorneys are forced to pay for the class representative’s services out of
pocket, the Eleventh Circuit may see an increase in settlement proposals across
the board. Consequently, strategic attorneys may attempt to recover their own
costs by utilizing aggressive settlement offers at the district court level. Data
support this hypothesis because the size of incentive awards is strongly linked
to the amount of attorney’s fees awarded.128 Further, scholars have posited that
“[i]f attorneys reward [class representatives] for serving the attorneys’ interests
at the expense of the class, we would expect that, holding other factors constant,
incentive awards will be more frequent and higher as fees increase.”129 In an
effort to compensate class representatives, class members bear the burden of
decreased recovery amounts. This strategy places the pecuniary interests of the
attorney at odds with the interests of the class.
Alternatively, attorneys may attempt to bring the case to a sister circuit
that has not adopted the Eleventh Circuit’s conclusion. The draw of an
incentive award may motivate class members to serve as class representatives,
thereby helping attorneys manage the lawsuit and keep legal fees low. For
example, under Holmes, attorneys could bring an identical class action in the
Ninth Circuit (assuming that jurisdiction is proper) and obtain an incentive
payment so long as the payment is fair.130
126. Id. at 1264–65 (Martin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
127. See supra Section II.B.
128. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 60, at 1308.
129. Id. at 1317.
130. See Holmes v. Cont’l Can Co., 706 F.2d 1144, 1148 (11th Cir. 1983) (discussing that courts
will “refuse[] to approve settlements on the ground that a disparity in benefits” between the named
plaintiffs and the absent members of the class “evidenced either substantive unfairness or inadequate
representation”)).
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While other jurisdictions experience an influx of class actions that push
the field of law forward, less desirable jurisdictions, like the Eleventh Circuit,
will now be left behind. It is well known that “counsel, judges, and academicians
employ the term ‘forum shopping’ to reproach a litigant who, in their opinion,
unfairly exploits jurisdictional or venue rules to affect the outcome of a
lawsuit.”131 Understandably, it will be hard to sell the position of class
representative if the costs outweigh the benefits. And, if it is possible to obtain
jurisdiction in another circuit that is more attorney or class representative
friendly, it will be advantageous to certify the class there.
Corporations seated in unfavorable jurisdictions will continue to benefit
from dated laws while other jurisdictions push forward with innovative claims.
Consider an employment discrimination class-action lawsuit against a business
that conducts all of its activity in Florida, Georgia, or Alabama. Before the suit
even begins, due to the Johnson decision, the Eleventh Circuit has already
disincentivized possible plaintiffs from coming forward. In a study analyzing
six class-action employment discrimination cases from 1993–2002, the average
sum of incentive awards was $1,481,962, and the median was $545,626.132
Further, the average recovery for each class member was $20,080, and the
median was $16,229.133 In the Eleventh Circuit, pre-Johnson, attorneys could
sleep easy at night knowing that the class was being properly managed because
the representative had a proper safety net covering their expenses. Now,
attorneys may question if the health of the class action is better suited in another
circuit where the representatives need not forgo hundreds of thousands of
dollars.
In 2002, class members in the Eleventh Circuit had two favorable choices.
They could either sit on the sideline and recoup a sizeable recovery, or they
could serve as class representative and recover a sizeable incentive payment
along with their share of the settlement fund. In 2022, a prospective class
representative must calculate the costs associated with the role. Due to the
complexity of employment discrimination cases, the costs of being a class
representative are unusually high compared to twelve other categories of classaction lawsuits that were surveyed.134 Plus, the prospective class representative
can expect the costs of their expenses to significantly absorb a large amount of
their recovery from the settlement fund.135 Knowing that most of your recovery
131. Friedrich K. Juenger, Forum Shopping, Domestic and International, 63 TUL. L. REV. 553, 553
(1989).
132. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 60, at 1334 tbl.5.
133. Id. at 1350 app. tbl.1.
134. Id. at 1332 (“Incentive awards were also common in employment discrimination cases, where
we believe the costs to representative plaintiffs are unusually high.”); id. at 1334 tbl.5 (displaying twelve
other categories being surveyed in addition to employment discrimination).
135. Id. at 1340–41 (“Employment discrimination cases are positively and significantly associated
with incentive awards absorbing a larger share of the recovery.”).

100 N.C. L. REV. 1293 (2022)

1310

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100

will be decimated by the costs of serving as class representative, and
understanding that there is no compensation upon completion, would you
volunteer as class representative? Even if the cause is compelling, is the journey
worth it? After Johnson, the most likely answer is no.
CONCLUSION
Despite the Johnson court’s best efforts to respect Supreme Court
precedent, its conclusions were misguided. Authorities and guidance from the
Eleventh Circuit, Justice Thomas’s dissent in Frank, treatises on class actions,
and an overwhelming volume of case law from sister courts attest to the need
for incentive awards to motivate class representatives. Additionally, the court
should have distinguished Johnson from Greenough and Pettus and further
considered the Holmes fairness inquiry. By neglecting these considerations, the
court erred in its decision.
What can be expected in the aftermath of Johnson? In the Eleventh Circuit,
lead plaintiffs are now at a significant disadvantage—working abundantly more,
for equal recovery, with substantially more costs and burdens. Going forward,
it will be difficult to motivate any class member to serve as lead plaintiff in a
class action before the Eleventh Circuit. Instead, attorneys may look to other
forums that allow incentive payments—thereby changing the fabric of law in
those preferred jurisdictions. This workaround runs contrary to our economic
and capitalist ideals. Class members are benefitting greatly at the expense of the
representative, who, on a pro rata basis, takes very little from the class members
through the incentive payment. Now, class representatives in the Eleventh
Circuit must combat social and economic hardships while class members idly
free ride through the class-action process.
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